Climate Superfund Bills in the U.S. States: A systematic study of opposition
- Climate and Development Lab
- 2 hours ago
- 4 min read

Aerial views of the damage caused by Hurricane Sandy to the New Jersey coast taken during a search and rescue mission. Photo credit: Archive Image / Alamy
New Brown University Climate and Development Lab Report Shows How Fossil Fuel and Energy-Intensive Industries Mobilize to Block “Climate Superfund” Bills Across State Legislatures
Executive Summary:
As floods, wildfires, extreme heat, and other climate-related disasters grow more frequent and costly, communities across the country are confronting the mounting financial and human costs of a changing climate. Homes are destroyed, residents are displaced, infrastructure is damaged, and local and state governments are left to finance recovery and adaptation. In response, a number of states are beginning to ask an important question: who should pay for these growing costs?
Climate superfund legislation seeks to make major fossil fuel companies contribute financially to climate-related damages based on their historical greenhouse gas emissions, with recovered funds directed toward climate adaptation, resilience, and infrastructure. Modeled in part on the 1990s federal Superfund framework (CERCLA), these policies represent an emerging approach to addressing the costs of climate-related damages at the state level. Climate superfund bills have now been introduced in 16 states, with Vermont becoming the first state to enact one during its 2023–2024 legislative session and New York following in late 2024. But these efforts have also prompted substantial organized opposition, political debate, and ongoing litigation, and no climate superfund bills have passed since.
What is getting in the way of more states passing climate superfund legislation? To answer this question, we present a systematic analysis of organizations and individuals who have testified, lobbied, or otherwise taken public positions on climate superfund legislation across twelve states: California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Maryland, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island, Virginia, and Vermont. We analyze lobbying and legislative position records with hearing and written testimony to examine patterns of support and opposition across states.
We found that supporters of climate superfund bills dominated public hearings: the ratio of support to opposition was approximately 3:1 in nearly every state. However behind the scenes powerful groups lobbied against climate superfund bills and outnumbered supporters.

Positions Taken on Climate Superfund Bills by State. Positions collected from lobbying reports, written testimony, committee bill analyses, and recordings of committee hearings, depending on what records were available in each state.
We identify the organizations and individuals most consistently opposing Climate Superfund legislation across states, the arguments advanced by supporters and opponents, and briefly describe the dynamics surrounding these legislative efforts in each state. Together, this analysis allows us to examine not only whether climate superfund bills succeed or fail, but how organized interests, political dynamics, resources, and recurring policy arguments shape their trajectories. A broad coalition of groups lobbied and submitted testimony against state climate superfund bills: the fossil fuel industry, chambers of commerce, resource-intensive industries such as construction and timber (along with unions connected to these industries), and conservative organizations.

Positions Taken on Climate Superfund Bills by Individuals (2a) and by Organizations (2b). Positions come from publicly available written testimony, committee reports, committee hearing recordings, and lobbying records. Sectors that took 20 or more positions on climate Superfund bills are shown. Individuals testifying on their own behalf (2a) includes anyone who did not list an organization, or stated that they were submitting testimony on their own behalf in either written or verbal testimony.
Across the written testimony and public hearings analyzed, nine recurring themes emerged from opponents of climate superfund legislation: concerns about trickle-down costs, broader affordability and economic pressures, continued reliance on fossil fuels, climate change skepticism, state capacity to administer and defend the legislation, legal and constitutional concerns, claims that the legislation unfairly singles out the fossil fuel industry, questions of responsibility and attribution, and arguments that states are already taking substantial climate action.

The report also examines seven state case studies to illustrate how these broader dynamics play out within individual legislative contexts. These include Vermont and New York, which enacted climate superfund laws; Maryland and Maine, which passed legislation establishing climate superfund studies; and New Jersey, Virginia, and Hawaii, where proposed legislation failed to advance. Together, these cases demonstrate how differences in political context, organized opposition, legislative strategy, and state capacity can shape the trajectory of climate superfund legislation. Rising costs of climate disasters, like the 2023 Vermont flood and 2023 Lahaina fire in Maui, have been a significant reason for states to advance climate superfund legislation, in spite of the difficulties posed by ongoing and threatened legal challenges.
Finally, the report concludes with lessons for looking forward. Drawing on the patterns identified across states, as well as testimony and research from attorneys, scholars, and economists, we highlight recurring challenges that may shape future climate superfund efforts. We provide links to some legal, economic, and policy resources that directly respond to common arguments raised in opposition.
About the CDL: Climate and Development Lab researchers at Brown have investigated offshore wind opposition networks, mapped climate denialist organizations, created a collection of state level environmental lobbying reports on 17 states, developed a database of state-level lobbying, and potential costs recovered from the local Rhode Island superfund bill.
Disclaimer: This report represents an initial phase of research, produced by a small team of graduate students in Brown University’s Climate and Development Lab. The statements, views, opinions, and information contained in the report are personal to the authors, and do not necessarily reflect those of Brown University.


