By David Ciplet and Alison Kirsch



Subsidies to dirty and wealthy fossil fuel companies represent a paradoxical misalignment of priorities. Action to remove fossil fuel subsidies must be a centerpiece of international and national climate efforts.



The final embers of heated debate have fully fizzled out at the UN climate change negotiations in coal-friendly Poland. While the formal negotiations were plagued by inaction, one hopeful dialogue emerged in Warsaw among some of the most influential players in global politics.

In a series of panels, representatives of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, International Energy Agency and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development all argued the benefits of, and need for, fossil fuel subsidy reform.

As Rachel Kyte, vice president of Sustainable Development at the World Bank explained during a panel on the subject, "This is the ultimate test of policy coherence. We can try to raise $100 billion. We can, as multilateral development banks, invest $27 billion in climate mitigation and adaptation projects [as we did] last year alone. But we're wasting $500 billion in fossil fuel subsidies each year."

Data from the organization Oil Change International confirms that the wealthy world is subsidizing the extraction, processing, transportation and use of oil, coal and natural gas at a rate of more than five times that of what we are contributing to help countries affected by climate change to adapt.

This is a gross and paradoxical misalignment of priorities. Governments waste precious time and money maintaining an uneven playing field for the largest fossil polluters, providing $6 to carbon-intensive fuels for every $1 that goes to renewable sources. Meanwhile, poor countries continue to experience climate change impacts worst and first. Those in the least-developed countries experience deaths from climate-related disasters like typhoons, droughts and floods at a rate of nearly six times the global average.

Yet, the current dialogue and efforts among the large multilateral development organizations are incomplete. The World Bank, for example, despite progress on a new policy to limit loans to coal, continues to finance fossil fuel projects. According to Oil Change International, fossil fuel lending from the bank actually increased from 2012 to 2013, with $336 million of continuing support for fossil fuel exploration projects.

Steve Kretzmann at Oil Change International explained, "Without a doubt, we have to think about putting production subsidies, particularly subsidies for new exploration in the red [unfavorable] category, and that's because we have IEA [International Energy Agency] and IPCC [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change] telling us we need to leave roughly two-thirds of the existing fossil fuels in the ground if we're going to meet our goals of staying under 2 degrees of climate change."

He continued, "Why in God's name are we spending billions more, incentivizing companies to find more of something that we can't burn? That makes absolutely no sense."

New research published in the journal Climatic Change revealed that just 90 companies produce two-thirds of all greenhouse gas emissions, with many of the biggest receiving large annual subsidies. In the United States alone, the top five investor-owned corporations on this major polluter list - Chevron, Exxon Mobil, British Petroleum, Shell and ConocoPhillips - receive $2.4 billion of tax breaks from Congress annually, despite holding more than $71 billion of cash reserves.

The growing international attention on this issue is beginning to pay off. The UK and the United States recently committed to stop funding coal-fired power stations in developing countries. And this week, the ministers of 28 member states of the International Energy Agency committed to phase out "inefficient" fossil fuel subsidies. They also encouraged countries to take subsidy reform into account as they prepare their commitments for a new international climate framework, to be agreed upon in 2015.

However, previous commitments to phase out fossil fuel subsidies made in 2009 by governments of the Group of 20 major economies have yet to be fulfilled. If we are to have any chance to prevent catastrophic climate change and redress the impacts of already-locked-in warming experienced by vulnerable peoples around the world, eliminating fossil fuel welfare to mega-polluters like Chevron and Exxon Mobil will need to become a centerpiece of the UN climate negotiations in 2014.

This will require civil society to ramp up efforts to challenge government handouts to big oil, gas and coal. These efforts already have broad public support. Fossil fuel subsidy reform means taking a firm stand against giveaways to the wealthiest and dirtiest corporations on the planet, while providing targeted support to the poor as we transition to sustainable energy.

Copyright, Truthout.org. Reprinted with permission.

By Keith Madden

A year from now, Lima, Peru will host the 20th Conference of the Parties (COP20) under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).  For Latin American Indigenous peoples—who make up a large proportion of the populations of Peru and neighboring Bolivia and Ecuador—COP20 is a pivotal chance to coordinate and leverage their influence on the international stage.



2010 was the last time Latin American Indigenous peoples had the opportunity to air their concerns about climate and environmental inequities—albeit outside of the official process. In April of that year, the first World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth was held in Cochabamba, Bolivia. The conference brought together over 30,000 activists from over 100 countries, largely as an alternative to the failures of the 2009 UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen.

Indigenous peoples fed up with the lack of results from the UN conference articulated their own vision of climate justice at the 2010 Cochabamba Conference.  The resulting People’s Agreement aimed to construct a new system based on harmony and balance between humans and Mother Earth.  They reconceived a series of rights that were overlooked during the official negotiations, drafting the landmark Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth.

What has happened to Indigenous people’s voices since then? Few Latin American Indigenous groups are able to travel to far-flung conference locations like Doha and Warsaw. Indigenous peoples continue to struggle for recognition and fair access to the closed intergovernmental negotiations.

Amazonian and Andean Indigenous groups have minimal say in critical decisions that affect their livelihoods.  For now, they are limited to non-governmental organization observer status, with restrictions that permit only a few registered conference entrants per organization. Thus, their impact on the tone and course of the central negotiating process is limited, especially in moments of tough deal-brokering.

Indigenous peoples continue attempting to influence the process from the inside. Rodolfo Machaca Yupanqui was representing Bolivia at this year’s COP19 in Warsaw as an Aymara Indigenous person and rural farmers' union leader. He identified a sad misalignment in outcomes between the Cochabamba Conference and the COPs—for example, the difficulty of inserting ideas about Mother Earth as the ultimate provider of life into the vast G77 negotiating group. However, he reiterated the consistency in principles between the Cochabamba Conference and Bolivia’s official negotiating positions.

The few Indigenous representatives at this year’s COP seemed somewhat reluctant to express views that reflect poorly on their government leadership. In a process where Indigenous peoples lack direct influence, governmental representatives often become their only link to closed decision-making sessions. Cutting off engagement could mean losing their diplomat spokespeople.

As Latin American Indigenous people work to ensure that their interests are incorporated and protected in future climate agreements, Peru must create the conditions necessary for the Lima COP to be reinvigorated with the spirit of the Cochabamba Conference.  This means allowing Indigenous voices to be heard directly—not merely through the actions of a few official delegation leaders and regional blocs, as in Warsaw.

For Indigenous people to protect their interests in Lima, the Peruvian government has a role and responsibility to facilitate an equitable process as hosts and ensure moral leadership that recognizes the broad ramifications of climate change for Indigenous and marginalized peoples worldwide.  If the answer is not another World People’s Conference, then Peru must play a very active role in setting new precedents for inclusiveness in Lima.

Domestic recognition of Indigenous people’s legal autonomy and self-governance (such as in Articles 57 and 171 in Ecuador’s Constitution) is seldom effectively enforced and protected. However, it is even more of a shame that Indigenous groups struggle with these same representation issues at the UN, by being denied the sovereignty that would give them a seat at the negotiating table.

For the world to finally witness a more inclusive COP, Peru and the UN must begin planning now to open the channels for Indigenous participation and make closed negotiations accessible to non-diplomats. The equity issues raised at the Cochabamba Conference should be at the heart of the debate. Article 6 of the UNFCCC Charter guarantees “public participation in addressing climate change…and developing adequate responses,” but Indigenous people contend that the UN process shuts them out.

The next major opportunity for Indigenous inclusion will be in Lima, where facilitation by the COP20 host could be crucial. Fortunately, Peruvian Minister of the Environment Manuel Pulgar-Vidal has shown signs that he is committed to an inclusive process by recently signing a joint commitment with WWF International to collaborate at the COP20.

Still, details about the proposed setup and participative format in Lima are only slowly emerging. Being equipped with more information will enable Indigenous groups to organize and have a voice in the proceedings. With the COP20 now less than a year away, the stakes could not be higher for Indigenous peoples.

This article was published here by Americas Quarterly     

By Alison Kirsch and Guy Edwards 



Chile is at a crossroads. Copper prices are falling, the gap between energy supply and demand is widening, and in December the second round of presidential elections will determine who will lead Chile in the next administration. Chile faces a difficult balancing act to maintain its strong economic growth and the energy this requires, while ensuring progress on its climate, environmental and clean energy goals. In this whirlwind of domestic change, Chile has the opportunity to reaffirm its position as a global leader on climate change.



Chile has the highest income per capita in all of South America, largely thanks to a recent boom in copper exports to China. Yet mining is energy-intensive and the government estimates that Chile will need to increase its energy supply 16% by 2020. As an energy-poor country, Chile is forced to import 75% of its energy, including expensive liquid natural gas. Sourcing this energy and its high price tag has generated a politicized and difficult debate without an easy way forward.

Meanwhile, Chile is making progress on its pledge to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions 20% below 2007 levels by 2020. Chile also recently doubled its renewable energy target from 10% by 2024 to 20% by 2025. At the UN climate change negotiations, Chile is part of the Association of Independent Latin American and Caribbean States (AILAC, in Spanish), which includes Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Panama, and Peru. This group, currently co-chaired by Chile and Colombia, emerged in 2012 in an effort to break away from the stifling North-South divide and push for binding emission reductions for all countries in a new treaty by 2015.

As the recent COP19 climate negotiations in Poland entered their second week, former Chilean president Michelle Bachelet secured an easy victory in the first round of presidential elections. In December Bachelet will face a runoff with the second-place candidate, Evelyn Matthei, from which she will likely emerge the winner.

Current president Sebastián Piñera will leave office without establishing a clear vision on national energy policy. Bachelet supports a variety of energy projects, including new coal-fired power plants and expanded import of liquid natural gas. Alarmingly, discussions of climate change and low-carbon development were largely absent from the presidential campaign.

At the center of this prickly energy debate is the controversy surrounding HidroAysén, a proposed 2,750-megawatt hydroelectric project in Patagonia. Piñera’s administration has postponed a decision on HidroAysén until after the elections. Bachelet is often quoted as saying that HidroAysén is “not viable.” Yet Waldemar Coutts, from Chile’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, believes Chile “needs to seek new energy sources to maintain growth, highlighting, in particular, non-conventional renewables.” Though Bachelet continues to promote importing expensive liquid natural gas, mounting pressure to feed the country’s hunger for energy could push her to reconsider her position on HidroAysén.

Andrés Pirazzoli, from Chile’s Office of Climate Change, said of the election, “We don’t foresee that it’s going to have significant impact [on climate change policy] due to nonpartisan consistency across administrations.”

Enrique Maurtua, regional coordinator for the Latin American branch of the Climate Action Network, is confident in Chile’s ability to lead AILAC alongside Colombia, but notes the tension between environmental concerns and Chile’s interests as a mining country. “If they succeed on the energy issues they are having, they will be a good model for the rest of Latin America,” he said.

Chile is not the only AILAC country whose economy depends on the extraction of natural resources. AILAC’s members’ similar backgrounds support collective ambition:  all AILAC countries have pre-2020 mitigation commitments, which is not true for many other developing countries. Might Chile take the plunge to further solidify its leadership and increase its own ambition before 2020? “It is still early to say, but Chile is doing its best to build capacity at home and develop as many domestic mitigation actions plans as possible. We want to quantify our every effort towards our goal, with an aim to exceed the challenge,” said Pirazzoli.

In the meantime, Coutts states, “We are a constructive group of countries, but we do not hesitate to demand that developed countries do more in terms of providing leadership and financial assistance.”

After the limited success of COP19, attention is shifting rapidly to the UN climate negotiations in 2014. With the pre-COP in Venezuela and COP20 in Peru, 2014 will be Latin America’s year. This is an opportunity for Chile and AILAC to exert a larger influence in the push for significant commitments and a new climate change regime by 2015. Yet AILAC can only be an international pacesetter if the domestic policies of its member countries reflect the group’s ambitious rhetoric at the UN.

With a new administration and shifting dynamics in the energy and mining sectors, Chile is on the precipice of change and can seize the opportunity to consolidate and enhance its actions on climate change. Backtracking now or failing to sufficiently implement its domestic policies will only serve to dilute Chile and AILAC’s progressive voice and leadership. Both are urgently needed to push aside the North-South divide and progress towards an ambitious and binding agreement for all countries in 2015.

Another version of this article was originally published here. 

By Timmons Roberts 

The shouting began just before 7 p.m. on what was supposed to be the last day of the COP19 (19th Conference of the Parties) negotiations inside the vast temporary metal and fabric plenary rooms constructed right on the soccer field in Warsaw, Poland’s national stadium. At first, the shouting from activists outside in the bleachers sounded like football cheers, but then they grew in volume.

Polish Environment Minister and COP19 President Marcin Korolec joked that “we are reminded that we are inside a football stadium.” Then it grew louder and more menacing: “Stop climate madness!” again and again. Delegates put on headphones to be able to hear the speakers, even though most did not need the simultaneous translation being produced by teams in seven separate soundproof cabins on a platform at the back of the room.

But then the shouting died down, and Karolec’s gaveling began in earnest. Agenda item after item was gaveled through:

“Hearing no objections, it is so decided.”

That was the easy stuff. The main text on climate finance, sweated over for two weeks by a group of delegates from nations around the world, met an objection from Nicaragua, speaking for the Group of 77 and China bloc, actually 134 developing nations representing nearly six-sevenths of the world’s population. The issue for this negotiating group was how two promises made at the contested Copenhagen negotiations in 2009 would be kept.

At Copenhagen, wealthy nations agreed to provide $30 billion over the three years (2010-2012), in an effort to provide financial assistance quickly to show their seriousness about helping the developing world. The funding was to be “balanced” between support for reducing fossil fuel use in their growing economies (mitigation), and to help them prepare for the expected increase in climate-related disasters (adaptation). This was the first promise, for so-called “Fast-start Finance,” and whether that promise was kept is sharply disputed.

The second promise was that the average of $10 billion a year over those three years would “scale up” to an amount approaching $100 billion annually by 2020. Being the first year after the “Fast-start” period meant that Warsaw was an important place to explain how we’d do that “scaling up.” Many activists called the meeting “The Finance COP,” in expectation that the topic would dominate the discussions.

In the end, that was not really to be the case. A new mechanism on “loss and damage” and a finalized agreement on avoiding deforestation were two major outcomes. Meanwhile, the “Long-term Finance” text debated for two weeks behind closed doors by the negotiating group was sharply divided.

After submissions of proposed text to the UNFCCC Secretariat, two weeks of negotiations, and a ministerial-level meeting on finance, a slim one-and-a-half page decision on a “Work Programme on Long-term Finance” was presented to the world’s nations on the last day at Warsaw. It included 13 brief numbered paragraphs, largely urging and reminding Parties to report on what they were doing on finance, to do their best and to continue their discussions.

On scaling up from $10 billion to $100 billion, just one key paragraph had any significant action, and that was modified by the weak verb, “urges.” The Work Programme states that the Conference of the Parties:

7. Urges developed country Parties to maintain continuity of mobilization of public climate finance at increasing levels from the fast-start finance period in line with their joint commitment to the goal of mobilizing $100 billion per year by 2020 from a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources, in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency of implementation.

Some Parties believed this wording implied a straight line from $10 billion in 2012 to $100 billion in 2020. When the text got its turn in the big final plenary session where the protestors were chanting outside the metal rooms on the soccer stadium’s field, Nicaragua spoke for the G77 and China group of developing countries in favor of specifying a mid-term target along the way, saying: “On Long-term Finance, we would like to add the text ‘with at least $70 billion by 2016.’”

Bolivia chimed in: “We are very much disappointed about the text we have in hand. This was expected to be the COP of financial and technological support. We were supposed to emerge with a roadmap to get us to 2020, instead we have unclear language.”

Speaking for the 48 Least Developed Countries group, Nepal said “My group came to Warsaw with great expectations. We called for pathways on finance, pre-2020 ambition, and called for a “loss and damage” mechanism separate from adaptation. We have compromised on many issues, but there is a limit to compromise, from the most vulnerable countries in the world.”

The U.S.’s negotiator Todd Stern responded calmly that the Long-term Finance text was a significant compromise for them, and that if it was reopened, that the U.S. would bring up more issues of its own.

Later, COP President Korolec instructed negotiators to join a huddle to work out their differences on this and other core issues remaining at the end of the negotiations. Quietly, the mid-term target demand for $70 billion by 2016 disappeared entirely from the list of demands for the text, and it passed to applause in the giant hall.

“Hearing no objections, it is so decided.”

For years now we’ve heard how promises not kept erode the trust so badly needed to make these critical negotiations a success. Without mid-term targets that create urgency to get us to that substantial 2020 target, it is hard to see how trust can be built. It also makes sense that one does not arrive expecting to win a 90-minute soccer match having only trained for 10 minutes at a time. Annual mid-term targets escalating by about $11 billion a year would get the finance team into shape for 2020 and build confidence that developed countries are good for their word.

So when 2015 comes, will we hear cheering from the stands, or jeers? Delegates from China and the Philippines expressed feelings of frustration common among developing countries. The Philippines stated, “Finance is the big disappointment of this COP. We engaged sincerely in these negotiations and we received in return nothing except a very unbalanced text.” China said, “The Long-term finance text has no balance in it. We need to see a timeframe, some milestones.” The Chinese representative added: “We are not asking too much—the current text does not meet the minimum requirements of developing countries.”

Beyond some small contributions to the Adaptation Fund and for a forests initiative, Warsaw should be seen as a lost opportunity to build trust and fulfill our commitment to create predictable and adequate funding for developing countries to green as they develop, and survive the storm ahead.

This article was originally published here. 

By Alexis Durand 

Photo: Push Europe
Activists lay down in the halls of the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Warsaw, Poland last week, forming the letters “W.T.F.” with their bodies.  The letters stood for “Where’s The Finance?,” and their message was clear - the failure to revamp the funding to help developing countries green their economies and prepare for climate change impacts had turned the conference into a deep disappointment.

The frustration expressed in the action reflected the sentiments that defined the recent international climate negotiations, the 19th Conference of the Parties (COP19).  COP19 was expected by many to be ‘the finance COP,’ and some hoped that this round of negotiations would produce a fair agreement on the future of climate finance and pave the way for further finance negotiations in Paris in 2015, when the global climate deal is supposed to be struck.

Most nations agree that developing countries need pledges of financial assistance from wealthier nations to contribute to domestic efforts to reduce their emissions and to adapt to the effects of climate change.  The World Bank estimates that developing countries’ needs will increase to hundreds of billions of dollars a year by 2020.   However, developed and developing countries have vastly different ideas of the form this support should take.  Because of these tensions, COP19 has failed to produce a meaningful pathway towards equitable climate finance.  Should we be surprised?  An autopsy of climate finance and the political tensions surrounding it reveals that the possibility of a powerful and just climate finance deal for 2013 was truly dead on arrival.

In Copenhagen in 2009, developed countries collectively pledged US$30 billion per year to support mitigation and adaptation efforts in developing countries.  Parties pledged to scale-up the yearly sum to US$100 billion after this ‘fast start’ finance period ended in 2012.  Although countries indicated that they have successfully delivered the agreed-upon sum during the fast-start period, the outlook for long-term funding is grim.  It seems that mobilized finance has plateaued after the fast-start finance period, and the Overseas Development Institute notes that pledges to UN climate funds have dropped 71% in 2013.

The issue of increasing the overall quantity and effectiveness of funds was advanced only fractionally during the Warsaw negotiations - transparency remains low, recent pledges are modest, and effective and just delivery of funds is still not assured.

The political climate at the negotiations made progress towards an improved new period of scaled-up climate finance impossible.  At COP19, the climate finance conversation remained split sharply along the divide between the global North and South.  Many of the 48 Least Developed Countries continued to push for quantifiable pathways for developing countries’ efforts to scale up climate finance, arguing that predictability is critical for them to plan their actions.  Additionally, they want the newest multilateral UN finance channel, the Green Climate Fund, to be well funded and to finally begin operations.

But none of the developed countries have yet committed to a scaling-up pathway.  Indeed, the UK is the only developed country to declare that countries should commit to roadmaps to scaling up public finance.  This adverse political climate, spurred by North-South tensions and conflicting ideologies, made the creation of an equitable and just climate finance scale-up system unlikely.

Certainly, progress has been made at COP19.  Several developed countries have publicly pledged funds to UN climate finance channels.  The Adaptation Fund reached its modest US$100 million fundraising goal during the COP, and the Green Climate Fund announced that it is completing the final steps that will enable it to begin operations.

Nevertheless, new pledges fall far short of the agreed-upon value and developing countries’ needs.  Additionally, transparency remains dubious, and no further action was taken at the COP to ensure that the finance is “new and additional” (as promised), or that it is distributed as grants rather than loans.  Pathways to scale up climate finance to the agreed-upon US$100 billion by 2020 were not established; even proposals to create an intermediate target (US$70 billion by 2016) were not accepted.  Developing countries left COP19 without a predictable source of funding.

In light of the results of the fast start finance period and the political climate at COP19, it is not surprising that negotiators failed to justly resolve the issue of climate finance.  After all of the negotiations and dialogues, trust between developed and developing countries was lower than ever, and developing countries had no confidence that developed countries will scale up finance adequately.

This raises the question: Is the demise of the possibility for a just climate finance deal symptomatic of a greater disease?  For decades, conflicting ideologies have created a climate stalemate, preventing the creation of a robust international climate action plan.  Compromise is a difficult pill to swallow, and sometimes developed countries must be willing to reach an agreement on developing countries’ terms.  As we approach the milestone COP21 in Paris, nations need to act collectively to protect mutual interests, prioritizing finance delivery to promote global climate justice.  A paradigm shift is necessary to resuscitate the possibility of just climate finance and an effective climate regime.

This article was originally published here.